Torah Constraints on Saving Lives

A long time back, I wrote about some of the practical limits life places on the mitzva of פקוח נפש. We’re all conscious of our responsibility to prevent death and illness wherever possible. Sometimes, perhaps, too conscious.

But I’ve come across a couple of passages in the Yerushalmi that push that point a bit further than I’d expected it could be pushed. These sources strike me as indicators that we moderns have different assumptions about life than were once standard.

Suicide by Cannibals

Here’s a Mishna from Yerushalmi (Gittin 4:9):

המוכר את עצמו ואת בניו לעכו"ם אין פודין אותו אבל פודין את הבנים לאחר מיתת אביהן

One may not redeem someone who sells himself and his sons to non Jews, but after (the father’s) death, one may redeem his sons

And here’s what the Yerushalmi itself says:

מתניתא בשמכר עצמו ושנה אבל אם מכר עצמו פעם אחת פודין אותו ואם מכר עצמו ללודים אפילו פעם אחת אין פודין אותו מעשה באחד שמכר את עצמו ללודים אתא עובדא קומי ר' אבהו אמר מה נעשה מפני חייו עשה

The Beraissa¹ is talking about a case where he sold himself more than once, but if it’s the first time, redeem him. But if he sold himself to Luddim [a tribe of cannibals], one may not redeem him even on the first event. It happened that someone sold himself to Luddim and the case came before Rabbi Avohu. [Rabbi Avohu] said: “What can we do? He did it to avoid starving.”

I should note that the Rambam (Matnos Aniim 8:13) rules like the Bavli, that we should redeem captives whenever there’s risk to life - even if the victim is a repeat offender.

But, in the context of the Yerushalmi, the Korban Ha’aida comments:

מפני חייו עשה. שלא היה לו במה להחיות את נפשו וראוי לפדותו וברייתא איירי בשהיה לו כדי חייו

Because he didn’t have enough [money] to keep himself alive it’s appropriate to redeem him. The Beraissa, however, is referring to the case of a person who had enough to keep himself alive.

This implies that someone not facing extreme poverty who nevertheless sold himself to Luddim should be left to die. These days, we have another word for such behavior: suicide. And the clear ruling of the Yerushalmi is that funds may not be “wasted” in any rescue attempt.

Even though the Bavli differs in the specific case, it’s not clear that even normative halacha wouldn’t place some kind of spending limits on suicide prevention.

Murder by Tefila

The second source involves the Yerushalmi Shabbos (19:2):

אדא בר אהבה איתיליד ליה חד בר בי מימסמיס ביה מית ר' אבין אמר נעשה פצוע דכא ונתענה עליו ומת רבנן דקיסרין מרין כרות שפכה נעשה ונתענה ומת

Ada bar Ahava had a baby boy [who was born without a foreskin]. He fussed [with the baby to be sure he was at least taking a drop of blood in place of bris mila² and as a result] the baby died. Rabbi Avin [disagreed] saying, ‘the baby became a פצוע דכא [because of the fussing] and [Ada bar Ahava] fasted so that the baby should die.’ The Rabbis of Caesarea ruled that [the baby] became a כרות שפכה and [Ada bar Ahava] fasted so that the baby should die.

According to the Korban Ha’aida, the difference between those two latter opinions is largely academic: as a פצוע דכא, the child would never be permitted to marry, and as a כרות שפכה he would be incapable of having children. Either way, Ada bar Ahava couldn’t see any point in subjecting his child to a lifetime of such a limits.

However, everyone seems to agree on two things: Ada var Ahava made a terrible mistake with his chumra of הטפת דם ברית and, once that couldn’t be undone, it was reasonable to actively daven for the child’s death.

Either way, I think we have two examples of uncomfortable approaches to human life.

Photo by Elen Sher on Unsplash

1. I’m honestly not sure why this language implies - and the Korban Ha’aida explicitly states - that we’re talking about a Beraissa here rather than a Mishna

2. According to the version in the Bavli (Shabbos 135b) he took the baby to 13 mohelim to make sure the הטפת דם ברית was done “properly”. The Bavli is silent on the consequences of the accident.